DIGI TGTS(C) /8/8/3

5 April 1999

CDS



TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATION KINGOWER

You asked for a brief on the way forward for targeting in the FRY.

GENERAL COMMENT

We need to increase the weight of effort:

More assets in theatre

Make maximum use of weather window with tacair. When weather poor, maximum use of CALCM/TLAM

Change to 24-hour campaign

We need greater coherence in the planning.

Targets that we fail to attack on a particular night do not necessarily appear on subsequent nights.

US planning for manned air is conducted from SHAPE and the CAOC in Vincenza, while 6th Fleet in Bahrain has an input for TLAM.

They all bring valid considerations to the table but I am often left with the impression that they do not talk to each other.

We need to consider taking greater risks:

Accept collateral and civilian casualties up to an assessment of "high" if the military significance of the target warrants it.

- Send manned air further north. Currently manned air (excluding stealth) has not gone much further north than Kosovo, but there are several suitable targets that could be prosecuted without going to the immediate environs of Belgrade.
- √ Manned air should be cleared below 15,000ft. Even to low level for high value, but one-off attacks.
- Attacks on IADS should be kept to the minimum required to provide safe passage for manned air.
 - The air defence system is not currently fighting back and we could redirect the effort currently being expended to more critical target sets.
 - Removal of some of the Relay and transmitter sites is reducing our own SIGINT gathering.

 Assuming we want more immediate results we should shift the emphasis from strategic target sets to attacks on troops and vehicles.

LIMITING FACTORS

 To-date the limiting factor for attack packages (besides the weather) has been SEAD and fighter escorts.

The arrival of the US CBG will provide more SEAD/fighters, but SACEUR's staff must bid for more required.

Or accept greater risk with reduced SEAD packages in selected areas

TARGETING

Within the last 3 days EUCOM has produced a Tactical-Air Master Target List.

This has 301 "strategic" targets.

We have attacked just over 100.

BDA is still limited.

But overall targeting priorities should be:

Strategic

Command and control.

National power – but not obliteration of power stations (careful consideration of humanitarian aspects required)

State Broadcasting.

Tactical

HQs/C3

LoC.

POL.

IADs.

Troops and fighting vehicles.

PERSONAL COMMENT ON TARGETING

We have offered the US 3 significant targets given to us by the SIS.

Hotel Jugoslavia in Belgrade – now the MUP HQ which decanted from the Ministry of Internal Affairs prior to that building being struck.

Batajnica Bunker, which now houses elements of the Defence Ministry.

The Central Post Office in Belgrade, which now houses elements of the Air Defence Central staff.

SECRET UK EYES

- The Batajnica Bunker may have been attacked but we cannot confirm this. Whatever, the list warrants immediate attention.
- The Hotel Jugoslavia may include some civilian casualties but is worth the cost.

UKTLAM CURRENT SITUATION

 HMS SPLENDID has currently got 19 targets loaded on board, of these, 8 have now been attacked.

UK CMSA are preparing further targets but are under considerable pressure just to keep up..

6th Fleet has provided missions on request and this has not proved to be a limitation.

However, we have not had sight of the US TLAM/CALCM Master Target

This would be extremely valuable: not only would we have sight of the "possible" it would relieve some of the pressure on the UK CMSA.

M C Heath Gp Capt ADI ITAG